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[Crim. No. 10296.

In Bank.

Nov. 30,1966.]

In re LOUIS D. PONCE on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Oriminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment.-To preclude the possibility that defendant's sentence for robber~·
might prejudice him in the Adult Authority's fixing of his term
in connection with a concurrent sentence for kidnaping for the
purpose of that robbery under Pen. Code, § 209, as the statute
read at the time of the offenses, the robbery sentence, the
. lesser of the two, had to be set aside.
[2] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Adjudication of Habitual
Oriminality.-In a habeas corpus proceeding involving attacks
on a judgment imposing concurrent sentences and expressl~'
adjudging petitioner an habitual criminal, the legal effect of
the determination of habitual criminality was moot where it
appeared that the determination made him ineligible for parole
until he served a minimum nine-year term, that he had served
the minimum term, had been paroled, and had returned to
prison under sentence for another crime.
[3] Oriminal Law~Habitual 01fenders-Proceedings Where Prior
Conviction Admitted.-In a prosecution for robberies and
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, where the information
also alleged and defendant admitted prior felony convictions of
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders,

§ 31.
McX. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475; [2] Habeas
Corpus, § 34(5) (j); [3,4] Criminal Law, § 1469.
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign.
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council .
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assault with a deadly weapon and robbery for which separate
prison terms were served, he had sufficient notice that the
charges could lead to a determination that he was an habitual
criminal without additional express allegations regarding
habitual criminality or the terms of Pen. Code, § 644.
[4] ld.-Habitual Offenders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction
Admitted.-Defendant was not denied the due process required
in recidivist proceedings where, during the proceedings befol'e
imposition of sentence and until 60 days after the commencement of imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 644, subd. (c», defendant
and his counsel had the opportunity to raise any question as to
,
the legal sufficiency of prior convictions to support the determination of habitual criminal status and as to circumstances
that might have led the trial court in its discretion to relieve
him of that determination, but neither defendant nor his
counsel availed himself of the opportunity.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from custody after judgment of conviction of first degree robberies
and kidnaping for purpose of robbery. Sentence for one robbery set aside; order to show cause discharged and writ denied.

)

Louis D. Ponce, in pro. per., and Marcus Vanderlaan, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, John
L. Giordano and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner attacks a judgment imposing
concurrent sentences for two first degree robberies and a
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and expressly adjudging
that petitioner is an habitual criminal who should be punished
under Penal Code section 644, subdivision (a).1 The judgment
was affirmed in People v. Ponce (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 327
[215 P.2d 75].
Petitioner contends and the Attorney General concedes that,
as established by the undisputed facts recited in People v.
IThe applicablo part of section 644, unchanged since the rendition of
the 1949 judgment here attacked, reads: "(a) Every person convicted
in this State of the crime of robbery . . . [or] kidnaping . . • who shall
have been previously twice convicted upon charges separately brought
and trieu, and who sllan have served separate tenns therefor in any state
prison . . . of the crime of robbery . . . [or] felonious assault with a
deadly weapon . . . shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be
punished by impl"isollment in the state prison for life."
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Ponce, su.pra,2 Penal Code section 654 3 precludes puuishing
petitioner for both the robbery and the kidnaping of Louis
Pitzel. (Neal v. State of Califm·nia (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9
Cal,Rptr. 607,357 P.2d 839].) [1] As in People v. Knowles
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 175, 180, 186, 189 [217 P.2d 1], criminal
conduct in connection with the robbery constituted kidnaping
for the purpose of robbery under Penal Code section 209 [IS
that statute read at the time of the offenses. Since the punishment for such kidnaping (life imprisonment with possibility
of parole) is greater than that for first degree robbery
(imprisonment for not less than five years; Pen. Code, § 213)
the robbery sentence must be set aside to preclude the possibility that the sentence might prejudice petitioner in the
Adult Authority's fixing of his term. (In re Ward (1966) 64
Cal.2d 672, 676 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; People v.
McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763 [26 Cal.Hptr. 473, 376
P.2d 449].)
[2] The legal effect of the determination o'f habitual criminality is moot. That determination made petitioner ineligible
for parole until he had served a minimum term of nine years.
(Pen. Code, § 3047.5.) Petitioner served that minimum
commencing in 1950 and has since been p.aroled and returned
to prison under sentence for another crime.
Regardless of their timeliness, petitioner's attacks on the
determination of habitual criminality are groundless. He
contends that he was denied the reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard that due process requires in recidivist
proceedings. (Oyler v. Boles (1962) 368 U.S. 448, 452 [7
L.Ed.2d 446, 82 S.Ct. 501].) [3] The information alleged
and petitioner admitted that in 1930 he had been convicted of
the felony of assault with a deadly weapon and served a term
in the state prison for that offense and that in 1940 he had
been convicted of the felony of robbery and served a term in
the state prison for that crime. The accusatory pleading thus
gave petitioner notice that' he was charged with having
suffered prior convictions that could lead to a determination
that he was an habitual criminal. This notice was sufficient
2Petitioner and two confederates held up Pitzel's cafe. A confederate
took money from Pitzel at gunpoint, then forced. him to move 60 feet
trom the bar to an office and 40 more feet from the office to the restroom.
Meanwhile petitioner at gunpoint had forced the customers and employees
into the l'estroom. There petitioner took money from Addis, a customer.
8Penal Code section 654: "An act or omission which is made punishable in diffel'ent ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no ease can it be punished
under more than one. • • ."
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without additional express allegations regarding habitual
criminality or the terms of section 644. (People v. Dunlop
(1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 314, 316 [227 P.2d 281] ; In re Mead
(1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 538 [206 P.2d 1091] ; see also People v. Jackson (1950) 36 Ca1.2d 281, 287 [223 P.2d 236] ; In re
Gilliam (1945) 26 Ca1.2d 860,866 [161 P.2d 793].)
[4] During the proceedings before imposition of sentence
and until 60 days after the commencement of imprisonment
(Pen. Code, § 644, subd. (c» 4 petitioner and his counsel had
the opportunity to raise any question as to the legal sufficiency
of the prior convictions to support the determination of
habitual criminal status and as to circumstances that might
have led the trial court in its discretion to relieve petitioner of
that determination. They did not seek to avail themselves of
the opportunity and therefore were not denied it. (Oyler v.
Boles, supra, 368 U.S. 448, 454.)
Petitioner contends that the determination of habitual
criminality is defective on the ground that at the trial it was
not alleged or established that he served separate terms for the
two prior convictions as required by Penal Code section 644.
(See People v. Oollins (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 460, 465 [39
Cal.Rptr. 595]; People v. Shaw (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 606,
616 [47·Cal.Rptr. 96].) Authenticated records now before us,
however, show that he completed and was discharged from his
1930 sentence before he suffered his 1940 conviction. (See In re
Wolfson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 20, 26 [180 P.2d 326]; In re Gardo
(1952) 108 Cal.App.2d 615, 616 [239 P.2d 77]; People v.
Shaw, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 616.)
The sentence for the robbery of Pitzel is set aside and the
Adult Authority is directed to exclude that purported sentence from its consideration in fixing petitioner's term. Petitioner is not entitled to release, however, for he is held under
other valid judgments of conviction. The order to show cause
is discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
Petitioner ~s application for a rehearing was denied December 28, 1966.
4Pcnal Code seetion 644: "(e) Provided, however, that in exceptional
cases, at any time not later than 60 days after the actual commencement
of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, provide that the defendant is not an habitual criminal, and in such case the defendant shall not
be subject to the provisions of this section or of Sections 304:7 and 3048
ot thi8 ~ode (Iimitin~ eligibility of habitual criminal8 for par()le]."

